

National Security Council Files

Was - November 11, 1943 thru December 31, 1943  
[1 of 2]

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]				
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	reports	Situation Reports	12/5/73- 1/1/74	B
2	cable	from Tel Aviv	12/5/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
NSC			1176	
FOLDER TITLE				
(7)				

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.  
 B. National security classified information.  
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.  
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.  
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.  
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.  
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS

11/5 732.6547  
November 1, 1973

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PM - Seymour Weiss *W*

Europeans' Reactions to the Middle East Crisis

On several occasions you have made it clear you would expect frank comments and even criticisms from your staff if we had reservations about a given policy. I think it is essential that such a spirit persist in this Department given the complex, sensitive and momentous issues with which you have to deal. It is in this spirit that I offer the following comments.

Recognizing that I may not be in possession of all the relevant facts, I believe there has been some over-reaction by the USG to recent European questioning of US policies and actions in the Middle East. You know full well that I endorse the prompt and forceful action taken by you and the President to thwart Soviet efforts to shift the military balance and to insert their military forces into the Middle East. Had they succeeded we would have faced an unprecedented crisis. I believe our allies were slow to recognize the essentiality of our actions, and their positive effect on European interests. Both during the crisis and since, I have told them so in no uncertain terms.

Nevertheless, certain factors have been stressed to me by European diplomats in the last several days which I feel warrant your attention:

(a) In a very fast-moving situation we were not always able to keep our Allies fully apprised of developments and of our own assessment of them. As a result they feel that

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they were asked to take positions or support US actions on matters of the gravest potential consequences to their national interests on the basis of inadequate information. The alert of U.S. forces, including those in NATO, was the outstanding example cited.

(b) Furthermore, they were puzzled by requests to them to suggest to the Soviets that detente was threatened when we were saying publicly that our detente relationship with the Soviets had been preserved and was proving extremely useful in settling the conflict.

(c) They have resented broad accusations of non-cooperation when, in fact, specific examples were quite isolated. The most important one was the recent FRG refusal to permit a shipment of arms to depart Bremerhaven. I think the FRG was mistaken. However, prior to this incident the FRG did not object to two earlier shipments from Bremerhaven and several earlier shipments by air from Ramstein. With the exception of the SR 71 proposal, so far as I am aware, we were refused no requests for air transit or refueling rights by our European Allies because we never formally made any, except to the Portuguese. In any event some of our Allies (in addition to the Portuguese) gave us support, in some cases risking strong adverse domestic political consequences.

(d) European dependence on Middle East oil is considerably greater than our own and the pressures they were under from the Arab oil producers were considerable. Their views in this regard may be faulted as short sighted, i.e., a Russian intervention in the Mid-East would hardly guarantee oil for Europe over the long run. Their myopia in this regard is probably not unrelated to the fact that most European states have less of a national commitment to Israel than we do. As a result they failed to recognize that the real issue was the USSR intervention, not the rights and wrongs of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

While I believe it is quite correct to make our positions forcefully to our Allies, particularly when we are

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engaged in a serious crisis that affects their interests as well as ours, I believe the series of harsh public statements on both sides of the Atlantic now threaten to poison relationships which are of fundamental importance to us in the long-run. I realize that you have requested a complete review of our relations with our NATO Allies. However, such a review is surely unlikely to conclude that it would be in our interest to see the gulf between the US and Western Europe widen--a goal long sought by the Soviet Union. Moreover, such a review will not by itself encompass all that I believe we should now be analyzing, as I indicate below.

I recommend that:

-- You direct that an organized, interagency critique of the crisis be undertaken without delay. It should cover both substantive and procedural aspects. On the substantive side it would analyze the motivations and actions of the Arabs, Israelis, our NATO allies, the Soviets and ourselves. On the procedural side it would look at how the crisis was managed in Washington.

-- State, Defense, JCS, CIA, and NSC should participate. The responsibility could be vested either in S/PC or in the NSC staff. However, wherever vested, two considerations should be emphasized:

- (1) The critique should be undertaken without delay while the facts are still readily available and while impressions are reasonably clear.
- (2) It should be a "no holds barred" effort, i.e., any reasonable question should be subjected to searching analysis, including those which might appear to be self-critical.

Based on my experience with past crisis situations I believe there would be a great deal to be learned from such a critique, if properly conducted. Its results could have potential utility for future crisis management.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Study of Alliance Relations During the  
Middle East Crisis

As you are well aware, we have had some difficulties in dealing with our allies during the Middle East crisis. Most of these difficulties stem from differences of interests. I believe that a study of the management of our relations with our allies during the Middle East crisis could result in useful recommendations on how to reduce or remove alliance frictions in future situations where difference of interest may exist or arise.

With your approval, I will sign the NSSM at Tab A requesting that a study of the management of our relations with our allies during the Middle East crisis be forwarded no later than December 15, 1973, for your consideration.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the NSSM at Tab A.

\_\_\_\_\_ APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE

SECRET/NODIS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/NODIS

National Security Study Memorandum

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: A Study of Alliance Relations During the Middle East Crisis

The President has directed that a study be undertaken of the management of our relations with our major allies and friends during the Middle East crisis.

The purpose of this study is to determine the best methods and procedures for conducting consultations, coordination, and exchanges with our allies and friends during future crises, especially any in which our interests might substantially diverge.

Some of the pertinent questions that should be addressed are:

- In what specific instances did we fail to receive what we regarded as sufficient cooperation from any of our allies and in what specific instances did we fail to offer what they regarded as adequate consultation? In both instances, a study should be made of the exact sequence of events. In particular, what policy assumptions did we make about the readiness of our allies to support us and what specific attitudes, interests and policies of major allied countries were revealed by the crisis?
- To what extent were allied differences aggravated by differences in policy as opposed to lack of consultation, information, etc.?

The study should include recommendations on how to reduce or remove alliance frictions in situations where differences of interest may exist or arise.

This study should be conducted by an ad hoc group consisting of representatives from the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by a

SECRET/NODIS

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representative of the Department of State. Because of the sensitivity of the issues being investigated, the work of the group and its product are to be closely held. The study should be submitted for Presidential consideration by December 15, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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PMS HENRY KISSINGER  
CARE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC  
DO NOT SELL ISRAEL OUT TO THE UN. WE DO NOT HAVE FRIEND THERE.  
SUPPORT ISRAEL. ACT NOW.  
MICHAEL AND LINDA SCHAFER

The White House  
Washington

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PMS HENRY KESSINGER

WHITE HOUSE DC

STRONGLY URGE PROMPT U S DIPLOMATED AND MILITARY HELP TO ISRAEL

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The White House  
Washington

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PMS MR HENRY KISSINGER, SECRETARY STATE

WHITE HOUSE DC

I DEEPLY ABHOR THE ATTACK UPON ISRAEL BY THE FORCES OF EGYPT  
AND SYRIA ON YON KIPPUR THE HOLIEST DAY OF THE YEAR IN ISRAEL

I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR SUPPORT POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY,  
AND WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH IS DESPERATELY NEEDED IN ISRAEL

MRS ANNE SILBER 4011 MERIDIAN AVE MIAMI BEACH FL 33140



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The White House  
Washington

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8 PMS DR HENRY KENSINGER

9 WHITE HOUSE DC

10 IMMEDIATELY SUPPORT ISRAEL CONDEMN PREMEDITATED BRUTAL ATTACKS

11 BY EGYPT AND SYRIA

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13 DR AND MRS FRED STREIT

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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ACTION  
6224 - Follow-on #1

SECRET (GDS)

November 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
SUBJECT: Critiques of the Middle East Crisis

I understand from General Scowcroft that you have asked for a note to each of the WSAG principals reiterating your request for their critiques of the handling of the Middle East crisis. You will recall that, at one of the last WSAG meetings on the subject, you asked each to record his views of what had been done well during the crisis and what might be done better in future crises.

Mr. Colby has already sent you his critique and I have sent you a separate memo with a note for him thanking him warmly for it, as you requested.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memo to Messrs. Rush and Clements and to Admiral Moorer.

SECRET (GDS)

HHSaunders:tmt 11/21/73



6224 - Follow on #1

SECRET (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH  
DEPUTY SECRETARY CLEMENTS  
ADMIRAL MOORER

SUBJECT: Critiques on the Handling of the Middle East Crisis

I want to take this occasion to reiterate my thanks and congratulations stated at one of our last WSAG meetings on the excellence with which each of the WSAG members handled his duties during the recent Middle East crisis. I hope that each of you will find an occasion to pass along my thanks to appropriate members of your staff.

You will recall that we agreed at that meeting that it would be a good idea if each WSAG principal were to reflect on the handling of the crisis and to provide a critique from his own perspective on the things that had been done well and the things that might be improved next time. I would appreciate it very much if you might send those along in the next few days.

Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (GDS)

HHSaunders:tmt 11/21/73

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INFORMATION  
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SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

November 21, 1973

NOTE FOR THE FILE

General Scowcroft called me to say that Dr. Kissinger did not wish to issue the NSSM suggested in the attached memo. Instead, he wished a memorandum to each of the WSAG principals reiterating his message made at a recent WSAG meeting for the individual critiques for the handling of the crisis.

I am sending to Secretary Kissinger separately (#6224 Follow-on) the memo to the WSAG principals which he has requested. This folder can therefore be closed out.

Harold H. Saunders

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

HHSaunders:tmt 11/21/73

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS

ACTION

November 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

DONALD J. STUKEL

WILLIAM G. HYLAND

SUBJECT:

A Critique of Middle East Crisis Management

State/PM has recommended to you a NSSM study critiquing our management during the Middle East crisis and analyzing the substantive issues posed by that crisis. (Tab 1)

We would recommend strongly against a NSSM so broadly conceived. Your overriding objective in the next weeks will be to have the best possible substantive preparations for the Arab-Israeli peace conference, and all of your best people should be devoting their full time and attention to that. This means that any such critique will be done by a second echelon or others who were not the key actors in the crisis.

Moreover, at one of the last WSAG meetings, as the fighting stopped, you asked each of the WSAG principals to give you a memorandum on their views of how the crisis had been handled and where improvements could be made. Our experience with critiques, such as the one proposed, is that they absorb an inordinate amount of time and manpower and we doubt that this one will add significantly to what the WSAG principals will say more crisply and usefully in their memoranda.

If there is a specific substantive issue that needs to be studied as a result of the crisis, it is the management of our relations with our allies in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas. We have prepared a draft NSSM requesting a study of the management of our relations with our allies during the Middle East crisis (Tab A). This study would address some of the specific issues raised by PM rather than tying up a lot of people on a broad study.

If you agree, the memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab 2 would forward a proposed NSSM for his approval.

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RECOMMENDATION:

- That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab 2.
- With the President's approval, that you sign the accompanying NSSM.

Concurrence: Dick Smyser

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